Lion Cipher Lab
Audit your Active Directory for excessive privilege (least-privilege hardening)
- Identity & Access Management
- Advanced
- ~2-3 hours (most of it is the one-time lab build)
- Free · no account required
Why it matters
In almost every real intrusion that ends in ransomware or mass data theft, the attacker's win condition is the same: reach Tier 0 -- control of the identity system itself -- because whoever controls Active Directory controls every server, workstation and account it manages. The dangerous part is that privilege in AD is transitive: nested groups, delegated rights and object ACLs quietly stack up until a low-tier helpdesk account effectively inherits domain-admin control that nobody ever intended to grant. A plain look at 'who's in Domain Admins' misses it completely. This lab teaches you to…
What you'll learn
- reasoning about Active Directory privilege as a transitive graph (principals + the rights between them)
- measuring a directory against Microsoft's Enterprise Access Model / tier model (Tier 0 = control plane)
- expanding nested group membership with Get-ADGroupMember -Recursive to reveal hidden privilege chains
- finding protected/privileged accounts via AdminCount=1 and the adminSDHolder mechanism
- reviewing delegated ACLs (GenericAll / WriteDacl / WriteOwner) on sensitive AD objects with Get-Acl
- spotting privileged accounts with SPNs and stale/never-expiring passwords, and why that is risky
- remediating the CLASS of over-privilege (JIT/PAM, ACL cleanup, logon restrictions) and re-auditing to prove it
- judgment: when a graph/audit tool beats a manual review, and why Tier 0 is where the effort belongs
Steps in this lab
- The problem: privilege in AD is a graph, and it's transitive
- The yardstick you audit against: the Enterprise Access Model (Tier 0)
- Judgment first: manual review vs a graph view, and where the effort belongs
- Build (or reuse) an isolated AD lab you own
- Seed a realistic over-privilege (so there's something honest to find)
- Audit 1 - expand Tier 0 membership recursively (the chain a list hides)
- Audit 2 - find protected accounts by AdminCount, and catch the orphans
- Audit 3 - read the delegated ACLs on sensitive objects
- Audit 4 - privileged accounts that are also service or stale accounts
- Remediate the CLASS of problem, not one account
- Re-audit to PROVE the risk is gone (your before/after)
- The judgment to keep