Lion Cipher Lab
Detect DCSync attacks from directory-replication telemetry
- SOC Analyst / Blue Team
- Advanced
- ~60 min
- Free · no account required
Why it matters
DCSync is how attackers quietly steal every password hash in a Windows domain -- including krbtgt, the master key that lets them forge 'golden tickets' and own the network for months. They don't have to touch the Domain Controller's memory or drop malware; they just ask the DC to replicate its secrets, pretending to be another DC. That request leaves ONE reliable footprint: a Security Event 4662 with the directory-replication rights. If you can spot that event coming from an account that is not a Domain Controller, you catch one of the most damaging attacks in existence at the moment it…
What you'll learn
- Reading Windows Security Event 4662 and its Properties GUIDs
- Recognizing the DCSync (T1003.006) replication fingerprint
- Hunting EVTX logs with chainsaw and Sigma
- Writing and testing a tight Sigma detection rule
- Tuning out real false positives (Domain Controllers, Azure AD Connect)
- Layering deeper defenses: source correlation, network detection, deception canaries
Steps in this lab
- What DCSync is, in one breath
- The one footprint it leaves: Security Event 4662
- Why some networks are blind to this (the prerequisite that trips people up)
- Get chainsaw (your log-hunting tool)
- Get a REAL DCSync log sample (no attack required)
- Hunt it with chainsaw + Sigma (the bundled rules)
- Write your OWN Sigma rule (own the detection, don't rent it)
- Re-run chainsaw against YOUR rule and confirm it fires
- The judgment call: the false positives that will bury you
- Do it better: three layers a pro adds on top