Lion Cipher Lab

Map a real OT intrusion with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: the matrix Enterprise ATT&CK deliberately leaves out

Why it matters

Enterprise ATT&CK — the catalogue most analysts mean when they say 'ATT&CK' — deliberately stops at the edge of the physical process. It will happily describe an attacker phishing a power utility, stealing credentials, and moving laterally across Windows machines, but it has no technique for the thing that actually turns off the lights: sending a command that opens a breaker, or reprogramming the safety controller that is supposed to stop an explosion. That is not an oversight; it is a scope decision, because the GOAL of an OT attack is not data — it is a physical, often safety-critical,…

What you'll learn

Steps in this lab

  1. The gap: Enterprise ATT&CK stops at the edge of the physical process
  2. The second matrix: ATT&CK for ICS, and the tactics that only exist here
  3. When to use which — and why a real OT intrusion always uses BOTH
  4. Choose the incident — and do NOT conflate the two Ukraine attacks
  5. Build the table — start with the IT beachhead (Enterprise ATT&CK rows)
  6. Mark the crossing — the single most important row in the table
  7. Map the OT payload — the ICS-matrix rows where the process gets hit
  8. Verify every ID on the live matrix — and refuse to invent precision
  9. The payoff: chokepoint analysis, and the handoff to OT monitoring
  10. Why this is the skill, and when NOT to reach for it

Open the full interactive lab →