Lion Cipher Lab
Plan a post-quantum cryptography migration with a CBOM
- GRC / Compliance
- Advanced
- ~90 min
- Free · no account required
Why it matters
An adversary can record your encrypted traffic and stored ciphertext today and decrypt it years from now, the moment a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) can break RSA and elliptic-curve crypto. That is the 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat, and it puts long-lived secrets — health records, source code, state secrets, keys — at risk right now, before any quantum computer exists. But you cannot migrate what you cannot see: most organizations have no idea where their vulnerable crypto lives. The first, unglamorous, highest-leverage deliverable is an inventory and a prioritized…
What you'll learn
- Building a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)
- Classifying crypto by CRQC harm (Shor vs Grover)
- Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk triage with Mosca's inequality
- Mapping to FIPS 203/204/205 and CNSA 2.0
- Reasoning about hybrid key exchange and crypto-agility
- Sequencing a phased PQC migration roadmap
Steps in this lab
- The problem: you can't migrate what you can't see
- Understand the harm model: Shor breaks, Grover only dents
- Build the CBOM: a machine-readable crypto inventory
- Triage with Mosca's inequality: X + Y > Z means you're already late
- Map targets to standards: FIPS 203/204/205 and CNSA 2.0
- Why hybrid: hedge against a flaw in the new algorithm
- Assemble the roadmap — and name the failure modes